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Abstract
We extend the protection for sale framework by modelling non
tariﬀ barriers. Explicitly introducing partial rent capturing leads to
a testable speciﬁcation that bridges the gap between the theoretical
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model and its empirical implementa-
tion, where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection. Our
econometric analysis supports the augmented speciﬁcation and leads
to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model.
JEL classiﬁcation: F13
¤We are grateful to Rob Feenstra whose questions prompted this research, to Kishore
Gawande for providing us with the data, and to Geert Dhaene for help with the estimation.
The usual caveat applies: All remaining errors are ours.
11 Introduction
Due to the elegance of its theoretical argument and the encouraging empir-
ical evidence, the “protection for sale” approach of Grossman and Helpman
(1994) has quickly become one of the leading explanations of trade policy
determination. However, whereas the original model is meant to analyze the
tariﬀ formation process, recent empirical work1 uses US data on coverage
ratios as the measure of protection. This discrepancy is pointed out, among
others, by Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu (2002) and McCalman (2000),
who ﬁnd supporting evidence for the model using tariﬀ data from Turkey
and Australia respectively. On the other hand, there is good reason to use
NTB data: successive rounds of GATT-WTO negotiations have substantially
constrained the use of tariﬀs, and non tariﬀ barriers have come to replace
them as the instrument of choice used by protectionist governments.2
To overcome this discrepancy we explicitly model, in a protection for sale
framework, restrictions that do not necessarily generate revenues for the gov-
ernment. We characterize the equilibrium protection structure that emerges
when they are implemented. We show that if rent capturing is complete,
quantitative restrictions are strategically equivalent to tariﬀs in the lobbying
game we consider. For the more relevant case of partial rent capturing, we
derive an augmented speciﬁcation that depends on the degree of rent cap-
turing. Using the same dataset as in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000),
Eicher and Osang (2002), and Goldberg and Maggi (1999), we estimate the
augmented speciﬁcation by maximum likelihood and ﬁnd that only part of
1Empirical studies include Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay
(2000), Eicher and Osang (2002) and Esfahani (2001) — for a survey see Gawande and
Krishna (2003).
2Notice that in this paper we take the use of NTB as the result of an institutional
constraint – in particular multilateral GATT negotiations – rather than trying to explicitly
model the unilateral choice of alternative policy instruments by a government like in
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000). The fact that the choice of protectionist instruments
is constrained by multilateral negotiations is highlighted among others, by Rodrik (1995):
“As for the shift towards NTBs, this is usually explained by reference to successive rounds
of agreements under GATT, which by cutting and binding tariﬀs have left governments
little discretion over their tariﬀ levels.” (page 1485).
2the rent from trade barriers is captured. Furthermore, the results imply that
the US government expects to forego 28% of the rents. In addition, the esti-
mates of the structural parameters of the original speciﬁcation are aﬀected.
In particular, compared to Goldberg and Maggi (1999), the implied share
of the population involved in lobbying is signiﬁcantly lower (34 instead of
88 percent). Finally, a formal test of the original speciﬁcation against our
augmented model rejects the case of perfect rent capturing.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows: In section 2 we de-
velop the augmented model, section 3 characterizes the equilibrium protec-
tion structure, and section 4 presents the empirical results.
2 The model
Recall the speciﬁc factors model that forms the economic foundation of Gross-
man and Helpman (1994)’s “protection for sale” approach. A small, open
economy consists of 1+n sectors, indexed by i = 0;:::;n, that produce under
constant returns to scale. Sectors f1;:::;ng each use a sector speciﬁc factor
plus a common mobile factor. The exogenously given world market price for
the output of each of these sectors is denoted by p¤
i, while the correspond-
ing domestic price is p¤
i + ti where ti is the import tariﬀ 3 imposed on this
commodity or the shadow value of a quantity restriction.
Sector zero is special in that it only uses the mobile factor. By appropriate
choice of units, sector zero turns the mobile factor into output one-to-one.
Using its output as the num´ eraire, we normalize the price p0 to one. Strictly
positive production in this sector implies that the wage of the mobile factor
(labor) will also equal one. The same hold for the world market price p¤
0,
if we allow for free trade in this commodity. The production possibilities of
3The original model allows also for import subsidies as well as export taxes/subsidies.
The subsequent literature has largely disregarded these policies in line with the empirical
facts or even explicitly excluded them, as in ?) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000).
In our context subsidies would be paradoxical because partial rent capturing translates
into partial funding and therefore we follow suit.
3the other n sectors are summarized by proﬁt functions ¼i(pi) that can be
interpreted as the rewards of the speciﬁc factors.
The economy is populated by N agents who might diﬀer in their factor
endowment. All of them supply one unit of labor, and at most one sector
speciﬁc factor. Let ®i be the fraction of the population that owns the speciﬁc
factor i. All agents share the same preferences represented by a quasi-linear,
additively separable utility function u = x0 +
Pn
i=1 ui(xi), where xi is the
individual’s consumption of good i and the ui(:) are diﬀerentiable, strictly
concave subutility functions. Optimizing subject to a given income level I,
every individual demands xi = di(pi) ´ (u0
i)¡1(pi) of goods i = 1;:::;n and
x0 = I ¡
Pn
i=1 pidi(pi) of the num´ eraire. Domestic demand for good i can be
satisﬁed through domestic production and/or imports, deﬁned as:
mi = Ái(ti) ´ Ndi(p
¤
i + ti) ¡ yi(p
¤
i + ti);
where yi is the domestic supply of commodity i derived from ¼i via Hotelling’s
lemma. Note that since mi(ti) is strictly decreasing, it can be inverted. This




Given that we allow trade policy to take the form of tariﬀs as well as
quotas, let Q denote the subset of sectors that face quantity restrictions
and T the remaining sectors, that are subject to tariﬀs. Note that T could
well be empty, in which case all sectors are subject to a quantity restriction.
However, in what follows, we consider the general mixed case.
Whereas for tariﬀs it seems natural to assume that the revenue is cap-
tured by the domestic government, this is less clear in the case of quantity
restrictions. In the case of a voluntary export restraint, for example, foreign
agents obtain the quota rent. We account for this possibility by assuming
that for each sector i 2 Q a percentage °i 2 [0;1] is captured domestically.4
4We do not explicitly consider the possibility that the quota rent is captured by a
4We can now deﬁne the trade policy game. The organized sectors, Lf1;:::;ng,
submit contribution schedules Ci(t;q) to the government, which depend on
the policy vector chosen, where t is a vector of tariﬀs applied to all sectors
i 2 T and, similarly, q is a vector of quantity restrictions for all sectors









where the gross pay-oﬀ functions of the sectors are deﬁned as follows
Wi(t;q) = li + ¼i(p
¤
i + ti) +®iN(r + s) 8i 2 T




i (qi))+®iN(r + s) 8i 2 Q; (1)
where, in turn, the per capita tariﬀ revenue, r(t;q;°), and consumer surplus,















































3 Equilibrium Protection Structure
In solving the game between organized sectors and lobbies we are looking for
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, deﬁned as follows
separate domestic interest group or by foreign lobbies. Those cases are discussed by
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000), who also allow the government to choose among policy
instruments. We abstract from these possibilities here as our objective is to check the
robustness of the empirical tests of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model which have
not included such extensions.
5Deﬁnition 1 The collection (fC0
i (t;q)gi2L;(t0;q0)) is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the tariﬀ and quota game if C0





i=1 Wi(t;q), and, given fC0
j(t;q)gj2Lni,
no lobby i has an alternative feasible strategy Ci(t;q) that would yield a higher
(net) payoﬀ.
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) derive a useful characterization of sub-
game perfect Nash equilibria in menu auctions. We restate their proposition
here using our notation:
Proposition 1 (fC0
i (t;q)gi2L;(t0;q0)) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
for the tariﬀ and quota game if and only if:
i) C0
i (t;q) is feasible 8i 2 L,
ii) (t0;q0) 2 argmax (1 ¡ ¯)
P
i2L Ci(t;q) + ¯
Pn
i=1 Wi(t;q),
iii) (t0;q0) 2 argmax (1 ¡ ¯)
P
i2L Ci(t;q) + ¯
Pn
i=1 Wi(t;q) + Wi(t;q) ¡
Ci(t;q) 8i 2 L,






i (ti;qi) = 0.
Assuming diﬀerentiability of the contribution schedules and combining








rWi(t;q) = 0 (2)
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where ±i;j = 1 if i = j and zero otherwise.5 Substituting these partial
derivatives back into equation (2) we obtain the following result:












































where Ij is an indicator that takes a value of one if the sector is organized and
zero otherwise, while ®L =
P
i2L ®i describes the fraction of the population
that is organized.
The equilibrium tariﬀ is exactly the solution obtained by Grossman and
Helpman (1994). Our result for the quota, on the other hand, requires ex-
planation. Consider the case where the quota rent is fully captured (°j = 1).
The tariﬀ equivalent of the quota then equals the solution for the tariﬀ. The
above proposition thus implies:
5Note that we do not need to distinguish sectors that face a tariﬀ from sectors subject
to a quota (that is, whether i 2 T or i 2 Q) because only the direct proﬁt term would
diﬀer; however, the indicator in front of this term does not switch on since i cannot equal
j for cross derivatives.
7Corollary 1 Enacting a quantity restriction in a particular market is equiv-
alent to setting the corresponding tariﬀ as long as the quota rent is fully
captured (°j = 1).
The intuition for this result is appealing. Choosing a (binding) quota or
a tariﬀs allows the government to determine an outcome in the market for a
traded good, i.e. the combination of quantity demanded and domestic price.
The lobbies’ contributions then depend only on the market outcome, and not
on the policy instrument used to achieve it.
Consider now the more general case in which capturing is only partial.
What we have in mind are for example product standards, which raise the
domestic price of a commodity without creating rents that could be captured.
How does partial capturing aﬀect the level of protection resulting from the

















where ²j is the import demand elasticity (positively deﬁned). The sign of
this derivative, and thus the eﬀect of partial capturing on the protection level
depends on the term in square brackets. Assuming that sector j is organized,
lower rent capturing will tend to increase the equilibrium protection level the
lower the import penetration ratio, the smaller the government’s weight on
aggregate welfare, and the more concentrated the ownership of the organized
sectors.
4 Empirical test
A number of studies have estimated the original Grossman and Helpman
(1994) theory for a cross section of US manufacturing industries using cov-
erage ratios as the measure of protection. As we already pointed out the
reason for this choice is that successive rounds of GATT-WTO negotiations
have imposed extensive constraints on the use of tariﬀs. In their well known
8paper, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) use a maximum likelihood methodology
and conclude that “the theoretical model is not inconsistent with our data.”.
Similar results have been obtained by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)
and Eicher and Osang (2002).
We transform the equilibrium tariﬀ and quota equations as in Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) and include an additive error term. The estimating equa-























+ ¸ + ²2j: 8j 2 Q (5)
where µ =
1¡¯
¯+®L(1¡¯) and Ã = ¡
®L(1¡¯)
¯+®L(1¡¯) and correspondingly µ0 = 1
°µ,
Ã0 = 1
°Ã and ¸ = ¡
1¡°
° . The sign restrictions implied by the model are
that µ > 0, Ã;¸ < 0 and (µ + Ã) > 0. Two issues have to be considered
when estimating the model. Because coverage ratios lie between zero and
one, the dependent variable is censored on both sides. Furthermore, there
are good reasons to believe that import penetration and the binary political
organization variable are not exogenous. We control for both, following the
approach taken by Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
If product j is protected by a policy instrument which allows for complete
rent capturing, protection will be set according to equation (4). This is
the implicit assumption underlying previous empirical work. On the other
hand, if only a share °j of the rents is captured domestically, the optimal
level of protection is determined by (5).6 We estimate both equations using
maximum likelihood, and refer to Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for further
details on the approach.7 A description of the data we use can be found
6The cross–sectional nature of the dataset forces us to focus on a uniform degree of
rent capturing across industries when it comes to the estimation .
7The maximum likelihood estimator from Goldberg and Maggi (1999) jointly estimates
the equation of interest—(4) or (5)—with two reduced form equations. Import penetration
and the organizational status are explained by the set of instruments from ?). The three
error terms are assumed to be jointly normally distributed and potentially correlated. The
9Table 1: Estimation of the augmented Grossman-Helpman model by MLE
GM99a (2) (3)
inverse import penetration (X=M) -0.0093¤¤ -0.0081¤¤ -0.0053
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0055)




ˆ ¯ 0.986 0.983 0.988
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
ˆ ®L 0.883 0.489 0.338
(0.223) (0.134) (0.244)
ˆ ° 1.000 1.000 0.718
(0.135)
Log-likelihood -308.2 -305.4
a Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Table 1
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
¤ signiﬁcant at the 10% level, ¤¤ at the 5% level, and ¤¤¤ at the 1% level
in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). 107 industries are included in the
sample.
The results of our estimation are reported in Table 1, where for compari-
son we have included the baseline estimates of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) in
the ﬁrst column. The second column presents our results for the hypothetical
case in which rent capturing is complete. Our estimates are similar to theirs,
except for small diﬀerences in the reduced form coeﬃcients, which lead to a
lower implied share of the population involved in lobbying. These diﬀerences
are likely due to residual diﬀerences in the dataset.8
In the more realistic case where not all the rents from protection are
captured domestically, equation (5) applies. The results for this case are
reported in column (3). Most importantly, the negative constant term indi-
censoring of the dependent variable and the discrete nature of the organization dummy
are explicitly accounted for.
8We were not able to obtain the very same dataset used by Goldberg and Maggi (1999).
10cates that the US government, realizing that the use of NTBs leads to an
additional welfare loss, chooses — ceteris paribus — a uniformly lower level
of protection. This interpretation is conﬁrmed by the implied value for °,
the degree of rent capturing, which is signiﬁcantly less than one. In par-
ticular, our estimates imply that only 72 % of potential rents are actually
appropriated by the US government.
The diﬀerence between organized and unorganized sectors remains, as
can be readily seen from the coeﬃcient on the interaction term. Organized
sectors receive signiﬁcantly higher protection than their unorganized coun-
terparts. It might seem surprising at ﬁrst that import penetration alone does
not play a signiﬁcant role. Notice, however, that we are essentially estimat-
ing two diﬀerent coeﬃcients for each subset of the sample, organized and
unorganized sectors. In this view, the coeﬃcient for the organized subsam-
ple is the sum of the two coeﬃcients reported above. It is only information
from the unorganized sectors that would allow us to separately identify the
role of import penetration. The theoretical model, of course, predicts that
unorganized sectors should receive negative protection. Since the coverage
ratios are censored at zero, this implies that if the model were deterministic,
we should not have any information to this eﬀect coming from the unorga-
nized subsample. In the stochastic context at hand, obtaining the predicted
negative coeﬃcient must be due to large errors, which in turn explain the
insigniﬁcance of said coeﬃcient.9
The third sign prediction of the model, namely that the sum of the two re-
duced form coeﬃcients is larger than zero ﬁnds strong support in the data.10
This is reﬂected in the lower implied share of the population that is orga-
nized. While Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimate that over 80 percent of
the population is involved in trade–related lobbying, we ﬁnd a more reason-
able estimate of 34 percent, which is closer to the share of the workforce
employed in organized sectors (around 50%). In line with previous results,
9In the baseline speciﬁcation the coeﬃcient on inverse import penetration partially
picks up the role of the constant, so that this eﬀect is not apparent.
10The t-statistic for this test is 4.646.
11the weight attached by the government to aggregate welfare is estimated to
be very high.
Note that the estimated degree of rent capturing ° could be given a
more general interpretation. In practice protection is set at a much more
disaggregate level than the three digit SIC industries for which we have data.
No single three digit sector can be characterized as protected exclusively by
either tariﬀs or quotas. Both tools will instead be employed for diﬀerent
products in every industry, so both equations are relevant.11 In light of this
argument equation (5) can be understood as a weighted average of both
original formulations. Suppose that a fraction ± of the products in industry
j are protected by a tariﬀ, while the remainder is covered by a quota. For
the latter only a fraction °0 of the potential rents are captured. The linear
combination of the two equations with the appropriate weights leads to a new














The right hand side takes the same form as in equation (5) only that now
° =
°0
1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ °0)
;
which is a function of the structural coeﬃcients ± and °0 that cannot be
identiﬁed separately. The impact of the rent capturing coeﬃcient in the
equation is scaled up if a large fraction of products is protected by tariﬀs.
11OECD data for the U.S. at the 2-digit ISIC industry classiﬁcation reveals that, at this
crude level of disaggregation, the level of nontariﬀ trade barriers is positively correlated
with the amount of tariﬀ protection, in 1988, 1993, and 1996. The correlation between
the change in use of the two instruments was positive between 1988 and 1993, but turned
negative between 1993 and 1996, after the Uruguay round. From the cross-sectional cor-
relation we learn that industries with a higher than average level of tariﬀ protection also
receive a higher than average level of protection by nontariﬀ barriers. This is not incon-
sistent with the observation in the introduction that in industries were tariﬀs are lowered,
nontariﬀ barriers are erected. In response to the WTO rules, countries substitute tariﬀs
by nontariﬀ barriers, but this only applies to changes over time.
12An estimated ° of 0.72, as in Table 1, is compatible both with an industry
protected by a quota of which 72% is captured, as well as with an industry,
where half of the products are protected by tariﬀs and the other half by a
quota, of which 56% is captured, etc. The estimation remains unchanged,
only the interpretation of the results in the third columns is aﬀected. In light
of this, the relatively high estimates of ° seem even more plausible.
Finally, we performed a speciﬁcation test of the augmented model (in col-
umn 3) versus the standard model (in column 2). This corresponds to testing
whether ° is equal to 1, versus the alternative of ° smaller than 1. The p-
value associated with the test statistic is 0.019. A one-sided test, rejects that
° is equal to one at a signiﬁcance level of 2%.12 This conﬁrms the impor-
tance of explicitly accounting for partial rent capturing when estimating the
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model.
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